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1 Introduction
Quantum physics is a very successful theory for predicting nature. However,
in spite of many attempts, a mathematically and philosophically convincing
basis for the interpretation of quantum phenomena has not yet been found.
As stated recently by Zeilinger [34], there are at least two levels of inter-
preting quantum mechanics: the statistical interpretation in the narrower
sense introduced by Born [7], on which there is almost complete consensus
between physicists, and the interpretation of the meaning of the quantum
mechanical concepts, where no agreement has been reached and all existing
interpretations have been found wanting.
The ‘orthodox’ Copenhagen interpretation in terms of state reduction by
external measurement loses credit because it becomes meaningless for the
universe as a whole. There have been a number of proposals to change
the structure of quantum mechanics, e.g., through pilot waves (Bohm [5]),
consistent histories (e.g., Omne`s [23]), event enhancement (Blanchard &
Jadczyk [4]), or gravitational objective reduction (Penrose [24]).
Perhaps the main reason why there is so little progress on the meaning of
quantum mechanical concepts is that it is usually seen as thoroughly en-
meshed with measurement problems. I believe that this is a mistake, and
that more clarity can be obtained by separating the analysis of meaning from
that of observability. The discussion thereby becomes more concise and clear.
Here I refer to meaning as a conceptual, logically consistent mathematical
framework that allows one to speak unambiguously about all the terms used
in the theory, in a way intuitively related to corresponding concepts of ex-
ternal reality. This part is often elegant and concise.
On the other hand, I refer to observability questions (or measurement prob-
lems) as the operational explanation of how to obtain quantitative values
for the observables of a system, preferably within the framework of a well-
defined mathematical theory. This part is usually messy, and it is the part
that I propose to avoid until the other part is satisfactory. (This also saves
me from entering a discussion about the meaning of words like ‘operational’
or ‘obtain’.)
For example, in classical real analysis, infinitesimals are an ill-defined, mean-
ingless concept, though they can be approximately realized, while random
sequences are a well-defined, meaningful concept, though there is no con-
structive way of finding one, except approximately.
A historical case supporting the power of this view of separating the analysis
2
of meaning from that of observability is the uncertainty principle. It was
argued by Heisenberg [14] in terms of observability, and later by Robert-
son [26] in mathematical terms as a simple consequence of the canonical
commutation relation [p, q] = −ih−. The mathematical argument takes only
a few lines and is simple and compelling; the discussion of observability is
complex but shows that the results of the mathematics cannot be in conflict
with what can in principle be measured by experiment.
Further support for the positive effect of the separation of meaning from
observability is given by Bell’s inequality (Bell [2], Clauser et al. [10]), a
purely algebraic statement whose clarity is compelling, and the subsequent
verification of its violation through experiments by Aspect [1].
Finally, it seems that measurement problems can be adequately analysed
by generalized observables defined as positive operator valued (POV) mea-
sures; see, e.g., Davies [11], Busch et al. [9]. The gradual and approximate
state reduction can be explained thermodynamically through dissipative in-
teraction by the coupling to a macroscopic apparatus or heat bath; see, e.g.,
Zurek [35], Joos & Zeh [16], Ghirardi, Rimini & Weber [13].
That obtaining information about a system and state reduction are not equiv-
alent things is a consequence of the possibility of nondemolition measure-
ments (Braginsky et al. [8], Kwiat et al. [19]) that produce knowledge
about a system but (almost) avoid state reduction. And since the measuring
apparatus necessarily involves a huge number of particles, any satisfactory
solution of measurement problems should not be a part of the foundational
concepts and these but be obtained as their consequence.
In an attempt to separate the discussion about the meaning of quantum
mechanics from that of experimental consistency, I searched the literature for
concise statements of the basic difficulties in terms unrelated to measurement,
but given in a clear mathematical context that allows one to analyse the logic
of the problems without losing oneself in philosophical speculations.
The outcome was somewhat surprising: The best presented mathematical
arguments turned out to have subtle flaws. This becomes apparent when
one reduces them to arguments residing completely within the universally
accepted statistical interpretation in the narrower sense.
Probably the weaknesses in the arguments escaped previous attention since
the arguments were only used for philosophical discussion and justification
of foundations, and never subjected to experiment. I therefore suggest below
some specific things that one should try to test with suitable experiments.
In the following, I shall present my analysis of some arguments related to a
3
realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics; realistic in the sense that it
allows to speak of definite values for all observables at any time that are,
however, only partially measurable.
The findings give rise to the hope that a consistent interpretation is possible
that respects the stochastic nature of quantum mechanics, but is also realis-
tic, with all the accompanying advantages for our intuition. In a companion
paper (Neumaier [21]), a proposal for such a realistic interpretation will be
presented.
2 Feynman’s argument
In his 1948 paper “Space-time approach to non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics” [12], Richard Feynman gives on pp.368-369 the following argument.
“We define Pab as the probability that if the measurement A gave the result a,
then measurement B will give the result b. [...] denote by Pabc the probability
[...] if A gives a, then B gives b, and C gives c. [...] If the events between a
and b are independent of those between b and c, then
Pabc = PabPbc. (1)
This is true according to quantum mechanics when the statement that B is b
is a complete specification of the state. In any event, we expect the relation
Pac =
∑
b
Pabc. (2)
[...] Now, the essential difference between classical and quantum physics lies
in Eq. (2). In classical mechanics it is always true. In quantum mechanics
it is often false. [...] The classical law, obtained by combining (1) and (2),
Pac =
∑
b
PabPbc (4)
is replaced by
φac =
∑
b
φabφbc. (5)
[for probability amplitudes φab with |φab|
2 = Pab] If (5) is correct, ordinarily
(4) is incorrect. [...] Looking at probability from a frequency point of view
(4) simply results from the statement that in each experiment giving a and
c, B had some value. [...] Noting that gzite5 replaces (4) only under the
circumstance that we make no attempt to measure B, we are lead to say that
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the statement, ‘B had some value,’ may be meaningless whenever we make
no attempt to measure B.”
Feynman’s argument sounds convincing but it has a flaw in the assumption of
(1), the conditional independence of c from a, given b, for all states summed
over in (2). This assumption is inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
Indeed, one of the characteristic features of quantum mechanics is its insepa-
rability, the impossibility of splitting a quantum mechanical system into two
that are independent. According to the Copenhagen interpretation (Bohr
[6]), and verified abundantly by experiment, the whole space-time set-up
must be specified to determine the correct outcome of an experiment. The
contradiction obtained by Feynman in comparing (4) and (5) therefore need
not have the consequence that B sometimes has no value, but serves more
naturally as a strong argument for quantum inseparability.
The Markov property (1) does typically not even hold for consecutive events;
due to the inherent noncommutativities, states ”remember” something about
their whole history and ”anticipate” something about their whole future.
To see this, pick a, b, c as observations of the same observable at increasing
times (for memory) and at decreasing times (for anticipation). It should be
an interesting project to find the conditions under which (and the accuracy
to which) the Markov property for a completely observed time series of a
sufficiently isolated system, lost in the quantum domain, is recovered in a
thermodynamic limit of a large number of particles.
We now show in detail that (1) is inconsistent with quantum mechanics.
According to the standard interpretation of probabilities as expectations of
projection operators we have Pab = 〈a|Πb|a〉 and Pbc = 〈b|Πc|b〉, where Πb =
|b〉〈b| is the projector to state b (and similarly for c). In order that Pabc
makes sense in the standard interpretation we need Pabc = 〈a|Πbc|a〉 with a
projector Πbc expressing the proposition Πb&Πc that B is in state b and C is
in state c.
In orthodox quantum logics (Birkhoff & von Neumann [3], Svozil [28]),
one considers a projector as representing the subspace of eigenstates to the
eigenvalue 1 of the projector and takes the logical operation & as subspace
intersection. One finds that, whenever Πb 6= Πc, we have Πb&Πc = 0 and
thus Pabc = 0. This is different from (1), proving that (1) has nothing to do
with quantum mechanics. And when Πb = Πc, we have Πb&Πc = Πc, hence
Pabc = 〈a|Πc|a〉 = Pac, and (2) turns out to be always true in the quantum
logic calculus, in contrast to what Feynman claimed.
On the other hand, the statement Pabc = 0 if Πb 6= Πc seems somewhat
counterintuitive, since if Πb ≈ Πc one might want to have Pabc ≈ Pac. In
view of the fact that, unless Πb and Πc commute, there is no simple algebraic
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expression relating Πbc to Πb and Πc, one is not compelled to adhere to
the rigid assignment Πb&Πc = 0 and might prefer to consider Πb&Πc to be
undefined if Πb and Πc do not commute, interpreting this as an indication
that Pabc cannot be predicted (in principle) by the formalism of quantum
theory (and thus may have any value).
In view of the fact that the counterintuitive abundance of zero projectors
has further undesirable consequences to be discussed in Section 5, this would
seem a more satisfactory solution of Feynman’s argument. A new quantum
logic consistent with this interpretation is discussed in Neumaier [21].
3 Wigner’s claim
Similar discussions as those given by Feynman usually suffer from the same
problem that the claimed probability cannot be written as the expectation
of a quantum proposition, i.e., a projector. For example, in his 1976 lecture
notes on the ‘interpretation of quantum mechanics’, Wigner [32, p.288]
writes,
[...] it remains essentially correct to say that the basic statement of quantum
mechanics can be given in a formula as simple as (42).
In adapted notation, for a finite sequence a, b, c, d . . . of results of measure-
ments of A,B,C,D, . . ., it reads
Pabcd... = tr ΠaΠbΠcΠd · · ·ΠdΠcΠb/ tr Πa
= 〈a|ΠbΠcΠd · · ·ΠdΠcΠb|a〉 if a is a pure state.
(42)
Now there is a problem with (42). It implies that repeating the measurement
of A immediately after a first measurement of A gives the result of the first
measurement with certainty. This is possible only if we assume that the
measurements performed are ideal.
But (cf. Wigner’s discussion in pp.283-284 of [32]; see also [16]) one cannot
make an ideal measurement of an observable with a continuous spectrum; and
the quantum mechanical analysis of the measurement process shows that an
ideal measurement of any quantity takes, strictly speaking, an infinite time.
And even allowing for that, the only measurable observables would be the
functions of scattering invariants (p.298). Hence formula (42) can apply to
real situations only approximately.
Therefore, unlike Schroedinger’s equation, (42) cannot be considered a ‘basic
statement’ and must be banned from the foundations. It should rather be a
consequence of more elementary, exact features of the theory.
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Indeed, Wigner ‘derives’ (42) from first principles. The argument, given
on pp.286-287, is identical to Feynman’s, assuming (without comment) the
Markov property that provides the independence that allows to multiply
probabilities:
If the first observation [...] This probability is |(aκ, bλ)|
2. The probability
that the next measurement [...] is then |(bλ, cµ)|
2 and the probability of both
outcomes [...] is |(aκ, bλ)(bλ, cµ)|
2 [...].
Thus the formula, based on invalid reasoning, is suspect.
This suspicion is confirmed by realizing that the operator whose expectation
is taken is generally not a projector, hence does not correspond to a ‘propo-
sition’ in the traditional quantum logic calculus. But what sense should it
make to talk about the probability of a statement that is not even logically
well-formed?
It seems to me that the only formula for probabilities verified (abundantly) by
experiments is the formula (see, e.g., equation (1.8) in Chapter 3 of Davies
[11])
P (B ∈ E|ρ) = tr ρB(E) (6)
for the probability that, in a mixed state with the density matrix ρ, the
generalized observable (POV measure) B has a value from a set E. For
ordinary observables B and singleton sets E = {b}, the ‘effect’ B(E) reduces
to a projector Πb. Equation (6) contains a special case of (42) only,
Pab = tr ΠaΠb/ tr Πa
= 〈a|Πb|a〉 = |〈a|b〉|
2 if Πa = |a〉〈a|, 〈a|a〉 = 1.
(7)
It is interesting to note that Wigner’s formula (42) reappears as the basic
formula in the theories of consistent histories (e.g., equation (4.3) in Omne`s
[23]). However, as mentioned on p.143 of [23], only the case of two reference
times can be proved, and this is equivalent to (6) (with ρ replaced by E1ρE1,
the mixed state obtained after the first state reduction).
However, we can give the probability (42) an alternative, correct meaning:
If a is a pure state then (6) implies that Pabcd is the probability of measur-
ing ΠaΠbΠcDΠcΠbΠa in that state! In general, therefore, Wigner’s formula
gives the probability of measuring in state a the last element in a finite se-
quence A, ΠaBΠa, ΠaΠbCΠbΠa, ΠaΠbΠcDΠcΠbΠa, . . ., assuming that the
measurements resulted in reductions of the intermediate states to the states
represented by the projectors Πa,Πb,Πc, . . ..
To see how we can possibly interpret this in terms of the uncontroversial part
of quantum mechanics, we consider a quantized relative of Laplace’s demon.
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Suppose there were a quantum demon with the unusual capacity to ‘see’ every
detail of a closed system, without interacting with the system. (The demon
doesn’t need to be physically realizable; this is just a fictional argument to
make a vivid point.) The demon leaves the whole system (consisting of the
measured system together with the measuring device) undisturbed and only
interprets our claims on measurements and compares it with the dynamics
it sees.
The demon notes the time intervals t, u, v, . . . between the successive mea-
surements A,B,C,D, . . .. What does it see us measure? In the Heisen-
berg picture, with unlabelled operators at the time of the first measure-
ment, the state of the complete system remains unchanged, and the measure-
ments are those of A,B(t), C(t+ u), D(t+ u+ v), . . .. If we use the Heisen-
berg dynamics and introduce the commuting operators Φa = exp(itH/h
−),
Φb = exp(iuH/h
−), Φc = exp(ivH/h
−), we see that the demon sees us measure
A,Φ∗aBΦa,Φ
∗
aΦ
∗
bCΦbΦa,Φ
∗
aΦ
∗
bΦ
∗
cDΦcΦbΦa, . . .. (This is quite different from
what Wigner asserts in his equation (43), where he assumes an additional
Heisenberg dynamics of the operators between the state-reducing measure-
ments.)
Comparing with the above interpretation of (42), and noting that projectors
are Hermitian, we see that the difference between the unproved formula (42)
and the demon’s objective description of our sequence of measurements is
the replacement of the commuting unitary Φ’s in the complete system by the
noncommuting idempotent Hermitian Π’s in the measured system alone.
Thus (42) is valid precisely to the extent that the time-dependent operators
(in the Heisenberg picture), as calculated by the Heisenberg equation for the
complete experimental setup at the time the next measurement is taken, can
be approximated in the assumed (time-independent) state of the investigated
subsystem by a two-sided multiplication with these projectors.
This shows clearly the aim of a correct measurement theory: It must exhibit
broad sufficient conditions for a system that guarantee, for all observables
to be measured, the validity of this approximation, and hence a complete
reduction of the wave packet.
I’d like to challenge the adherents of (42) to devise and perform experiments
testing validity, accuracy and limits of (42) when more than two (noncom-
muting) projectors are involved and the measurements are not ideal. The
findings should coincide with the interpretation in the Heisenberg picture
just given. (For the realization of arbitrary discrete projectors, note that
these can always be brought into the form UDU∗ with diagonal projectors
D and unitary U ; hence Reck et al. [25] applies.)
On the basis of such experiments it might also be possible to decide whether
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it is at all possible to perform experiments for measurements of probabilities
that cannot be expressed as the expectation of a projector.
4 Schro¨dinger’s argument
In his 1936 paper “Die gegenwa¨rtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik” [27]
(where the famous cat paradox appears), Erwin Schro¨dinger gives the
following argument (pp. 156-157 of the English translation):
At first thought one might well attempt likewise to refer back the always un-
certain statements of Q.M. to an ideal ensemble of states, of which a quite
specific one applies in any concrete instance – but one does not know which
one. That this won’t work is shown by the one example of angular momen-
tum, as one of many.
Imagine [...] the point M to be situated at various positions relative to O and
fitted with various momentum vectors, and all these possibilities combined
into an ideal ensemble. Then one can indeed choose these positions and
vectors that in every case the product of vector length by length of normal
OF [where F is the point closest to O on the line through M along the
momentum vector] yields one or the other of the acceptable values – relative
to the particular point O. But for an arbitrary different point O′, of course,
unacceptable values occur. [...]
One could go on indefinitely with more examples. [...] Already for the single
instant things go wrong. At no moment does there exist an ensemble of clas-
sical states of the model that squares with the totality of quantum mechanical
statements of this moment. [...] we saw that it is not possible smoothly to
take over models and to ascribe, to the momentarily unknown or not exactly
known variables, nonetheless determinate values, that we simply don’t know.
The problem is indeed unsolvable if one insists on the existence of a single
vector J of values determining all linear combinations u · J of the angular
momentum. For example, in measuring the inner product u ·J of the angular
momentum J with four or more triplewise linearly independent unit vectors
u, one obtains in each case values from the discrete spectrum of u · J , and
these spectra are inconsistent with a precise value of J . This is explained by
Schro¨dinger in detail on p. 164 in the context of a simpler one-parameter
example involving the observables p2 + a2q2 where a is a parameter. Com-
menting on it, Schro¨dinger writes on p. 165:
Should one now think that because we are so ignorant about the relations
among the variable-values held ready in one system, that none exists, that
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far-ranging arbitrary combination can occur? That would mean that such a
system of ”one degree of freedom” would need not merely two numbers for
adequately describing it, as in classical mechanics, but rather many more,
perhaps infinitely many.
Schro¨dinger dismisses this as not viable, but as I’ll show now, there is a seri-
ous possibility that precisely this is the case, thus invalidating Schro¨dinger’s
conclusion that it is not possible to ascribe to the momentarily unknown or
not exactly known variables determinate values. His conclusion is only valid
if one ascribes to each observable vector K a determinate value that is to be
used in the calculations for all u ·K.
However, as was observed already by von Neumann [22, IV.1.E], one can-
not, in general, combine the measuring recipes for two noncommuting ob-
servables to one for their sum, so that the sum of two observables is only
implicitly characterized through the axioms. This should forbid the naive
use of values for the components of K, say, to calculate the values of u ·K.
As I shall show now, one may consider each u · K as a (not necessarily
classical) random variable in its own right, and determine their relationship
for different u not by ordinary algebra but by the statistics derived from the
standard quantum mechanical recipes.
For simplicity, I’ll take for K in place of the angular momentum J the Pauli
spin vector σ which shows precisely the same problems as J . For each unit
vector u ∈ R3, the operator u · σ has the simple eigenvalues 1 and −1; thus
these are the possible values of u · σ. The projector to an eigenstate of u · σ
corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 is Πu :=
1
2
(1 + u · σ), with tr Πu = 1, and
the corresponding projector for the eigenvalue −1 is simply Π−u. For any
unit vector v ∈ R3, the probability for v · σ having the value 1 when u · σ has
the value 1 is then, according to (7),
Puv = tr ΠuΠv = tr (1 + u · σ)(1 + v · σ)/4
= tr (1 + (u+ v) · σ + u · v + i(u× v) · σ)/4
= 1
2
(1 + u · v),
(8)
and the probability for v · σ having the value −1 when u · σ has the value 1
is therefore Pu,−v =
1
2
(1 − u · v), adding up to 1, as it should be. Moreover,
Pu,−u = 0, as it should be. The probabilities depend continuously on u and
v, in a very natural way.
One would get precisely the same probabilities if one had extremely fragile,
classical spheres, painted white on one hemisphere and black on the other
one, and each sphere would be destroyed after observing the color at a single
point. One could still calculate probabilities for the colors of the other points,
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and any rotationally symmetric classical probability model produces precisely
the same probabilities as we just calculated for the spin.
More details on such a classical model for electron spin can be found in
Kochen & Specker [18]. They show that, under natural assumptions,
such a classical model is restricted to two-state systems. (In a companion
paper [21], I’ll show how one can reinterpret quantum mechanics in such a
way that the assumptions of Kochen and Specker become irrelevant, thus
removing this very restictive conclusion.) In any case, one such model is
enough to invalidate the cogency of Schro¨dinger’s conclusion.
To summarize, Schro¨dinger’s argument demonstrates that, in quantum me-
chanics, one cannot calculate the values for linear combinations of noncom-
muting observables from the values of the observables themselves; but this is
already obvious from the properties of the spectrum of operators. Only the
values of functions of commuting observables (and, in particular, of functions
of a single observable) can be predicted with certainty from the values of the
observables themselves.
However, as was shown for the case of linear combinations of the Pauli spin
matrices, his argument does not demonstrate that one cannot assign nat-
ural values to all observables that lead to natural and consistent classical
probabilities.
The nature of quantum observations may put severe limits on what is observ-
able through experiment and how these are combined to estimate the values
of other observables, but it does not seem to put restrictive limits on the joint
values of noncommuting observables. Indeed, von Neumann [22] shows in
the same section mentioned above how to get estimates of joint probabilities
of noncommuting quantities if sufficiently large ensembles are available.
5 Particle paths
It is widely believed that it is impossible to ascribe definite paths to moving
quantum particles, except at special points where the position has been mea-
sured. The particle paths seen in a cloud chamber, say, can still be explained
as an illusion created by correlation patterns among the atoms ionized by the
particles; see Mott [20]. No such analysis seems to be available, however,
that would explain why we see macroscopic bound states (such as you or me)
move along fairly definite paths.
The traditional context for discussing the inconsistency of definite particle
paths is the double slit experiment (Bohr [6]), where it is claimed that
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electrons (or photons) passing a diaphragm containing the two slits cannot
be said to have passed through one or the other slit, or – even worse – are said
to have passed through both, in a way (superposition) that defies intuition.
Unfortunately, the discussion seems always to be connected to measurement
questions, so that it is difficult to discern the mathematical content of the
arguments that claim nonexistence of the path (in contrast to its limited
measurability only, Wootters & Zurek [33]). However, I gathered some
indirect evidence about particle paths by reading between the lines of some
papers.
Feynman [12], in laying ground work for his (nonrelativistic) path integral
formalism, discusses on p. 371 the probability of particle paths as his first
postulate:
If an ideal measurement is performed to determine whether a particle has a
path lying in a region of space-time, then the probability that the result will
be affirmative is the absolute square of a sum of complex contributions, one
from each path in the region.
This postulate is used to show (among other things) that the most likely
paths are those close to the path determined by the least action principle.
No comment is given on the precise mathematical meaning of the terms in-
volved (except for the term “each”); thus we need to see whether we can
interpret this in an orthodox way. In the spirit of the standard interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, we need to assign to each (let us say open and
bounded) region Ω of space-time a projector ΠΩ to the subspace HΩ of all
wave functions belonging to states where the particle is with certainty in Ω.
Unfortunately, particle positions at different times are represented by oper-
ators x(t) = exp(iHt)x(0) exp(−iHt) that generally do not commute with
each other, with the consequence that it is unlikely that they have common
eigenvectors, which would be the elements of HΩ. Thus, it is very likely
that, for most Ω, this subspace consists of zero only; and ΠΩ would vanish.
This casts serious doubt on the applicability of the quantum logic recipe to
defining the projector ΠΩ.
Perhaps it is even impossible to make consistent assignments of all projec-
tors ΠΩ, in view of the fact that alternative attempts in consistent histories
interpretations run into contradictions (Kent [17]). (But possibly these con-
tradictions are due to the non-projector nature of these histories; cf. Isham
[15].)
However, we can be more modest and only look at special sets of paths for
which we may define proper projectors. For example, we may define the
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distance of two paths ξk : [α, ω]→ R3 (k = 1, 2) by
d(ξ1, ξ2) =
√∫ ω
α
(ξ1(t)− ξ2(t))2dt. (9)
Then, for each specific path ξ, we can use the position operators x(t) =
exp(iHt)x(0) exp(−iHt) to define the observable ∆ξ := d(x, ξ) that measures
the distance of the particle path from ξ. Suitable projectors are now the
projectors Πξ,ε projecting to the subspace spanned by the wave functions
corresponding to states in which ∆ξ has with certainty a value not exceeding
ε. Then, for a system in an arbitrary pure state a,
P (d(x, ξ) ≤ ε) = 〈a|Πξ,ε|a〉 (10)
is, according to the most orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, a
well-defined quantum mechanical probability for the event that the particle
path is, in the root mean square sense, within ε of the path ξ. Note that, in
principle, this formula can be tested experimentally; and by varying ε, the
complete distribution of d(x, ξ) can be found. The natural path to be used
for ξ is the expectation
ξ(t) = 〈a|x(t)|a〉 (11)
or a computable approximation to it (such as the classical path of the parti-
cle).
With formulas such as (9)–(11) available, it would be completely unreason-
able to assume that a particle has no definite path. If it hadn’t, what should
be the meaning of its expectation (11) and of the probability (10) of it being
close to a given path!?
It remains to discuss how this finding can be reconciled with the double
slit experiment. In an implementation of von Neumann’s method mentioned
in Section 4 to measure probabilities for two noncommuting observables,
Wootters & Zurek [33] measure in a modified double-slit experiment
both position and momentum of particles passing a slit:
If the measured momentum is positive, then we will guess that the photon
passed through slit A; if it is negative, then we will guess that the photon
passed through slit B. Clearly some of our guesses will be wrong – there are
photons that have positive values of measured momentum even though their
actual momentum was negative and they went through slit B.
[...] these two measurements cannot both be performed for the same photons,
and so [the figures] cannot refer to the same experiment. Hence, in accord
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with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is no para-
dox. The complementarity principle does not prevent photons from behaving
once as waves and once as particles. It only states that the same photon
should not reveal this ”split personality” in the same experiment. [...]
Despite the fact that we know with 99% certainty the paths of the photons,
they still have strong wavelike properties. [...] we have presented a result
which, although not paradoxical, was nevertheless surprising (that is, that
one can make a fairly precise determination of the slit through which each
photon comes with only a slight disturbance of the interference pattern).
The finding loses its surprise in the light of the above considerations that
suggest existence of the path but with intrinsic limitations on its observabil-
ity.
For the original double-slit experiment, the arguments generally agree on
the observation that there is no way to predict through which slit a particle
will pass. However, it is possible to compute with high confidence through
which a particle has passed when it has been observed at the photographic
plate. To do so, one only needs to compute the probabilities (10) for two
typical paths ξ connecting each slit with the position where the particle was
absorbed by the photographic plate. By comparing the likelihood ratios at a
given significance level one will find an exceedingly high likelihood for most
particles having passed through the slit closer to their recorded position on
the photographic plate.
Thus, after the event, enough information is available to decide reasonably
reliably on the particle path. One could also calculate the values of the
actions of the paths through the two slits ending at the observed position,
and use the stationary phase approximation of the Feynman path integral to
get (approximations to) the required probabilities. In any case, the statistical
analysis is essentially similar to that used for all experiments where an event
must be reconstructed from indirect measurable information and from the
way the experiment was prepared.
6 Conclusion
The strongest arguments against realism available in the literature dissolved
under a scrutinized analysis, using only that part of quantum mechanics for
which there is almost universal agreement about its validity.
This opens the door for an interpretation that, while respecting the indeter-
ministic nature of quantum mechanics, allows to speak of definite but only
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partially measurable values for all observables at any time. This kind of re-
alism is consistent with the intrinsic indeterminism required by Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relation if we distinguish carefully between what is and what is
measurable.
Though not proved by the present investigations, it appears that, indepen-
dent of the detailed description, a cautious realistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics is in full accord with the generally accepted quantum mechanical
formalism.
Here realistic means that in a completely specified state (not to be confused
with the ‘pure states’ of quantum mechanics) all observables have definite
values at all times that are, however, only partially measurable, according to
the stochastic predictions of quantum mechanics.
And cautious means, that one has to take into account the following four
restrictions:
1. Only probabilities defined by orthogonal projectors (for sharp observables)
or POV measures (for smeared observables) via equation (6) are measurable
and predictable.
2. For noncommuting projectors, the logical operation ‘and’ is not defined;
the corresponding questions may be asked (and may have definite, i.e., log-
ically consistent answers) but a precise answer cannot be found by experi-
ments.
3. From the values of commuting observables one can deduce values of func-
tions of these observables, but from the values of noncommuting observables
one cannot even deduce values of their linear combinations. Instead, func-
tions of noncommuting observables must be considered as random variables
on their own whose expectation values (and probability distributions) must
be calculated from the general quantum mechanical formalism and not from
a classical inference of measured linear combinations.
4. Due to quantum inseparability, the Markov property for a completely
observed time series is lost.
A constructive proposal for such an interpretation will be given in a com-
panion paper [21].
Appendix: Some final speculations
In this section I want to be more speculative, at the risk of being less precise,
less cogent, and more vulnerable about some issues discussed. I shall mention
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some ideas and ‘conclusions’ that are related to the preceding analysis though
far from being consequences of the rigorous observations of the preceding
sections.
A realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is independent of the mea-
surement problem and in better accord with classical (say, 19th century)
intuition. As we have seen, there seem to be no longer strong arguments
against a cautious realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
A problem reamining, and one that obscured for a long time the underlying
simplicity, is the lack of observable information on the quantum level. As
Schro¨dinger [27] puts it (p.159 of the English translation), referring to the
complementarity between position and momentum,
[...] the momentary statement content of the ψ-function is far from complete;
it comprises only about 50 percent of a complete description.
However, unlike Schro¨dinger, I conclude that, while the remaining 50 percent
will probably always remain unobservable, they may have a reality just as
objective as the (ideally) observable 50 percent. The fact that in many cases
we can choose which 50 percent of a complete description we want to observe
underlines this conclusion.
The fact that both past and future boundary conditions are needed (and
sufficient) to locate a particle path is consistent with the observation in Sec-
tion 2 that states anticipate something about their whole future. It is also
reminiscent of the action-at-a-distance formulation of classical electrodynam-
ics by Wheeler & Feynman [29, 30], where electromagnetic radiation is
explained through interaction with particles in the future.
By observing the right 50%, namely past and future position boundary con-
ditions about one of a pair of conjugate variables at both boundaries, we
might be able, in principle, to reconstruct the complete intermediate picture
as reliably as in the classical case, where one has the same option. But in the
classical case one has the additional and, for us as subjects acting based on
past information only, more useful option to predict the particle path from
initial conditions only (position and momentum in the past).
This state of affairs can be summarized in the statement:
Physics essentially describes nature as if everything had already happened,
and then expresses its laws as information about observed correlations. Since
some of the correlations involve time, it is possible to partially predict the
future from the past, or the past from the future, or an intermediate situation
from past and future observations.
This summary also explains neatly why questions such as the flow of time or
free will cannot be discussed within the framework of physics. Whether or
16
not time flows, whether or not our will is free, the four-dimensional picture
resulting from the course of nature, whether or not influenced by us, can (in
a gedankenexperiment) be replayed, after everything has happened, like a
movie. In the replay, everything is determined, and there is only the illusion
of free will, just as we are used from the cinema. But the physics, expressed
in the correlations between the parts of the movie, is identical to that in the
original version.
The principle of physics, that it restricts attention to that which remains the
same after everything happened, makes physics very powerful in that it allows
us to investigate a past of billions of years and to anticipate a future of billions
of years. But the same principle also generates its intrinsic limitations, that
physics must be silent about everything that cannot be captured by this
static, four-dimensional view of nature. This includes both questions such
as “how does reality happen?”, and many of the subjects of most interest to
people: freedom, purpose, and consciousness.
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